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A Manifesto, in 140 Characters or Fewer: Social
Media as a Tool of Rebel Diplomacy
BENJAMIN T. JONES AND ELEONORA MATTIACCI*
Can rebel organizations in a civil conflict use social media to garner international support? This article
argues that the use of social media is a unique form of public diplomacy through which rebels project a
favorable image to gain that support. It analyzes the Libyan civil war, during which rebels invested
considerable resources in diplomatic efforts to gain US support. The study entails collecting original data,
and finds that rebel public diplomacy via Twitter increases co-operation with the rebels when their
message (1) clarifies the type of regime they intend to create and (2) emphasizes the atrocities perpetrated
by the government. Providing rebels with an important tool of image projection, social media can affect
dynamics in an ever more connected international arena.
Keywords: rebel diplomacy; civil war; military interventions; social media; Libya
Social media has played an increasingly prominent role in recent conflicts – for instance, the
2010–11 uprisings in the Middle East, famously dubbed the ‘Twitter revolution’, the conflict
between Israel and Hamas,1 and even the civil war in Syria. Yet what do rebel organizations
really gain from using social media? Prima facie, not much – aside, perhaps, from improved
logistics. Rebel organizations face few constraints or costs in their use of social media,
potentially reducing the perceived credibility of their messages, which leaves the impact of
messages conveyed through this medium unclear.
We argue that rebel organizations use social media as a tool of public diplomacy – that is,
an instrument to offer international audiences their own narrative of the conflict and to present
themselves as a credible, preferable alternative to the existing government – through which they
can gain international actors’ support. In civil wars, rebels often seek the aid of outside powers,2
yet they typically lack the means to communicate directly with outside actors. Collecting
original data, we find that rebel diplomacy via Twitter significantly increases co-operation with
the rebels when their message: (1) clarifies the type of regime they intend to create and (2)
emphasizes the atrocities perpetrated by the government. Several implications follow from our
findings. First, social media enhances rebels’ ability to engage in ‘strategic moves’,3 thereby
increasing the likelihood that they will attract external co-operation through the use of public
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1 Zeitzoff 2016.
2 Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham 2011.
3 Schelling 1960, 122.
diplomacy. Secondly, social media plays an important role in leveling the playing field, by
allowing non-state actors to compete with states to gain access to foreign audiences. Finally,
in an increasingly connected international arena, the importance of public diplomacy continues
to grow, even in civil wars, where its role may have previously been discounted.
The use of social media as a tool of rebel diplomacy fits into a long history of attempts by
groups opposing the government to seek direct ways to communicate their agendas to potential
supporters – an illustrious example is Thomas Paine’s ‘Common Sense’ pamphlet. Yet research
in communication shows that Twitter is a particularly useful tool for rebels to project a
favorable self-image. First, Twitter grants access to international audiences to an unprecedented
degree: in March 2011, the first full month of the Libyan civil war, Twitter estimated that
approximately one billion tweets were sent every week.4 Secondly, it allows rebels to spread
their message to an audience of diverse geographical (and even temporal) composition:5 on
average, each tweet reaches 1,000 users, including non-followers of that tweet’s source.6
Thirdly, Twitter allows rebels to instantly disseminate their narrative of the conflict, thus
overcoming the government’s traditional attempts to omit, delay and bias the rebels’ side of the
story.7 These characteristics make Twitter an especially useful tool for rebel public diplomacy,
as it enables rebels to communicate their narrative of the conflict to a much larger foreign
audience than would otherwise be possible. This in turn enhances their ability to mobilize
foreign support for increased co-operation.
We first theorize the ways in which rebels can use social media as a tool of diplomacy.
Because we are interested in uncovering social media’s impact on rebel diplomacy, we theorize
and model the effects of rebel organizations’ social media usage, rather than study the effects of
social media more broadly. Secondly, we analyze the 2011 civil war in Libya. We conclude by
discussing the implications of our research.
REBEL COMMUNICATION AND DIPLOMACY IN CIVIL WAR
Rebel organizations typically operate at a material disadvantage relative to the government,8
and thus seek external support, which is often pivotal in helping rebel organizations survive and
attain a more favorable outcome.9 Prevailing accounts of external support focus on structural
factors of the conflict as determinants – for example, the rebels’ relative capacity, the regime
type of the state, the involvement of rival outside powers, and existing kinship ties between
rebels and outside states.10 Less explored is rebels’ active role in securing outside support. This
omission is all the more striking because rebels have usefully been theorized as behaving
strategically in studies of other aspects of civil war – for example, targeting civilians11 or
selectively spoiling peace agreements.12
We argue that, just as in their selective use of violence, rebels are strategic actors that will
endeavor to frame information for international audiences. In so doing, rebels engage in what
Schelling calls a ‘strategic move’, which consists of attempting to shape the perceptions of
4 Lotan et al. 2011, 1379.
5 Segerberg and Bennett 2011.
6 Kwak et al. 2010.
7 Hermida 2010.
8 Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009.
9 Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, and Joyce 2008; Gent 2008.
10 Gent 2008; Regan 2000; Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham 2011.
11 Kalyvas 2006; Wood 2010.
12 Kydd and Walter 2002.
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potential interveners in such a way as to make greater co-operation with the rebels appear to be
more beneficial.13 In other words, we investigate rebels as agentic actors that seek to promote
their own narrative of the conflict abroad in order to shape foreign perceptions of these
structural factors. For example, to persuade potential interveners that supporting the rebels will
not be too time intensive or resource consuming, rebels will portray themselves as strong and
resolute, capable of defeating the government in short order with international support.
By focusing on rebel agency in attracting foreign support, we theorize that rebels will
promote their own narrative of the conflict abroad by framing the conflict – that is, diffusing a
specific account of the events on the ground. Through the strategic use of framing, rebels can
mobilize support by shaping the cost–benefit calculations of the target.14
In their efforts to shape third parties’ perceptions, diplomacy is a vital tool for rebels, as it
allows them to portray themselves as a serious, credible alternative to the current government
and thus worthy of foreign support. Much like states, rebels invest resources in diplomatic
efforts, and sometimes even hire public relations firms or open political offices abroad.15
However, they encounter a catch-22: traditional forms of diplomacy that are crucial for rebels
to present an image of being worthy of statehood, such as sending diplomats abroad, are
predicated on the assumption that actors engaging in diplomacy have the authority to issue laws
and follow through on their commitments, yet rebel organizations do not meet those
prerequisites precisely because they are not states.16
In this context, Twitter is uniquely well suited for rebel public diplomacy – that is, for
establishing a direct link of communication with foreign audiences in order to obtain their
support.17 On the one hand, Twitter works like other, traditional tools of public diplomacy (such
as radio stations or pamphlets). It enables rebels to directly convey their own narrative of the
conflict to foreign elites and publics. Indeed, foreign audiences are often interested in
information about the conflict that is best gained from the rebels themselves, namely who the
rebels are and what their objectives are in the conflict. Information of this kind influences the
beliefs, perceptions and behavior of the recipients of this information, even though that
information is relatively inexpensive to produce, and not readily verified – that is, cheap talk.18
On the other hand, there are several characteristics that set Twitter apart from other tools of
public diplomacy. First, it provides access to larger numbers of people than radio or other
mediums, as rebels typically lack the infrastructure and distribution to disseminate their
message on an equivalent scale to that afforded by Twitter. In 2011, the year of the Libyan civil
war, Twitter had 100 million active users.19 Secondly, the online technology allows it to reach a
very geographically diverse audience. For example, Leetaru et al. find that the average distance
between Twitter users who tweet a message and those who re-tweet it is 749 statute miles,
suggesting that Twitter facilitates the transmission of messages between users across great
distances.20 Finally, in contrast to traditional methods of dissemination including pamphlets
and radio broadcasts, Twitter allows rebels to instantly and directly reach foreign audiences.
13 Schelling 1960, 122.
14 Benford and Snow 2000.
15 Huang 2016, 97.
16 Coggins 2015, 104.
17 Cull 2013.
18 See, for example, Thyne 2006; Tingley and Walter 2011. Moreover, though often perceived as inexpensive,
there are immediate costs associated with social media, both in terms of securing access to the internet and
because communication technologies often make it easier for the government to track and repress rebels.
19 https://blog.twitter.com/2011/one-hundred-million-voices.
20 Leetaru et al. 2013.
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Thus Twitter is an especially effective medium for rebel public diplomacy. Its unique social
media features make it easier for potential supporters in foreign states (both elites and the
masses) to access rebels’ information and narratives than would be the case with other
communication mediums. By more directly exposing a larger audience to their narrative of the
conflict, rebels may help mobilize larger coalitions to support their cause in foreign states. This
is likely to be especially impactful precisely because elites tend to have an early monopoly on
information about foreign conflicts.21 By reducing barriers to distributing news about the
conflict, rebels are able to reduce the information asymmetry between the public and the
government. In turn, this allows rebels to counter anti-intervention messages from elites and
bolster pro-intervention messages from elites. Moreover, because rebels can directly manage
their message, they can circumvent the media fatigue and bias that may otherwise impede the
dissemination of their ideas.
Therefore Twitter constitutes an important diplomatic tool for rebels, because it represents a
communicative space in which the government’s classic structural advantage over the rebels
does not necessarily apply. We now consider the mechanisms through which Twitter works, and
the messages that rebels are likely to transmit.
Mechanisms: How Twitter Helps Rebels Gain International Support
Rebels use social media to gain direct access to foreign publics and elites in order to shape foreign
perceptions of the conflict and thus increase co-operation from outside powers. Outside actors,
however, are strategic, and weigh the costs and benefits of supporting rebels. However, factions
often form within the decision-making elite between those who support getting involved in the
conflict and those who oppose it; the outcome of the competition between these factions is shaped
by the information available to them.22 Divisions of this sort arise not only within government,
but also outside it, for instance in elite circles such as the media, think tanks and academia.
Therefore, rebel diplomacy can play an essential role in providing information to elite factions that
are in favor of providing support. Two types of information are highly salient for foreign publics
and elites when contemplating support for rebels: (1) the costs, in terms of time and resources, of
intervention and (2) the potential benefits of a rebel victory.23 Outside powers are more likely to
intervene when they expect the costs to be relatively low and the benefits to be high. Rebels can
use diplomacy via Twitter to address each of these concerns, thus engaging in strategic moves
designed to shape the perceptions of major powers, analogous to social movements.24
Twitter, like other tools of public diplomacy, works by allowing rebels to reach multiple
audiences at once, both foreign publics and foreign leaders. This feature allows Twitter to work
to the rebels’ advantage through two sets of reinforcing mechanisms, both of which are widely
studied in analyses of the impact of social media on social movements25 and on government
decision making.26
The first set of mechanisms allows rebels to gain access to foreign narratives of the conflict.
First, Twitter enables disintermediation, meaning that rebels can communicate their message
without any media filtering.27 This makes their communication effort less subject to ‘media
21 Baum and Groeling 2010.
22 Western 2002.
23 Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham 2011.
24 Benford and Snow 2000.
25 Della Porta and Mosca 2005; Garrett 2006.
26 Drezner and Farrell 2008; Livingston and Asmolov 2010; Sell 2013.
27 Della Porta and Mosca 2005, 166.
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fatigue’ and other forms of media bias that are the product of the economic and professional
incentives that influence media coverage. Secondly, Twitter’s international reach allows rebels
to engage in scale shifting – that is, elevating a local crisis to the international level, thus
drawing direct and unfiltered international attention to the conflict and to their version of the
events on the ground.28 During the Libyan civil war, for instance, Twitter had a remarkable
‘megaphone effect’: links shared on Twitter attracted the attention of foreign citizens, news
media and governments.29
The second set of mechanisms through which Twitter usage operates builds on the first. Once
rebels have penetrated foreign discussions of the conflict, Twitter allows them to strategically
tailor their narrative of the conflict in order to increase foreign support for their cause at both the
domestic and elite levels. First, Twitter allows rebels to frame the conflict – that is, to present
their own narrative.30 Previous work has found that communication efforts from foreign elites
via US media can help shape US public opinion when they present rival narratives to those
promulgated by US elites.31 Such narratives are likely to be particularly impactful on public
opinion when they highlight ‘focusing events’, such as dramatic violations of human rights on
the part of the government. Indeed, public support for human rights in countries such as the
United States may be strongly influenced by major contemporary events.32 These focusing
events place pressure on the governments of potential interveners to take action, a phenomenon
widely recognized since the 1990s, when the so-called CNN effect motivated Secretary of State
Albright to state that ‘because we live in a democratic society, none of us [in the
Administration] can be oblivious to those pressures’.33 Social media gives rebels the ability to
exert this type of pressure with unprecedented directness, bypassing the media and elites.
Indeed, Jo notes that multiple rebel organizations use Twitter to directly engage with
international institutions such as the UN Human Rights Committee.34 Third-party governments
often feel compelled to respond and to explain their own actions (or lack thereof) during
international crises, so much so that the offices of the US secretary of state routinely detail their
foreign policies using tweets in 100 different languages.35
Secondly, by allowing rebels to state their preferences and commitments publicly, Twitter
helps them reduce the information asymmetry between foreign governments and their citizens.
This makes it easier for factions supporting intervention in third parties to build a larger
coalition. When support for policies such as intervening on the side of the rebels is based on
information that elites have but the public does not, the public might be more likely to doubt the
importance and feasibility of a pro-rebel intervention. As Colaresi demonstrates, ‘national
security secrecy […] robs an executive of the democratic tools to credibly signal to the public
[…] that threatening or cooperative gestures are in the national rather than a leader’s private
interest’.36 Opposition to intervening on the side of the rebels often capitalizes on this type of
information asymmetry by emphasizing how little is known about the rebels.37 Thus public
28 Livingston and Asmolov 2010, 751; Tarrow 2010, 219.
29 Aday et al. 2012, 12.
30 Keck and Sikkink 1998.
31 Hayes and Guardino 2011.
32 McFarland and Mathews 2005.
33 Albright in Gilboa 2005, 329.
34 Jo 2015, 29.
35 Seib (2012, 108), reporting the statement of Undersecretary of State McHale.
36 Colaresi 2012, 674–5.
37 For a recent example, see Senator Rand Paul’s opposition to arming Syrian rebels on the grounds that little
was known about the rebels during the Senate Foreign Relations Committee meeting on 18 September 2014.
Social Media as a Tool of Rebel Diplomacy 743
statements via Twitter are important for increasing support because they help pro-intervention
factions within the elite make a stronger case for their position. This is the case because such
statements publicly provide additional information, and therefore reduce the burden of
demonstrating to the public that intervention will help save lives and protect human rights,
rather than serve the narrow interests of government elites.
Finally, the rebels’ framing of the conflict on social media can provide supporters of the
intervention abroad with talking points – that is, with informed and detailed commentaries and
news on aspects of the conflict that the local government tries to hide from international
audiences.38 These talking points enhance the ability of foreign proponents of intervention to
persuade their publics by presenting a coherent and uniform narrative in support of involvement in
the civil war. This type of information is particularly important in civil wars, because information
about events on the ground is typically scarce, as well as systematically biased in favor of the
government – a fact that may hinder foreign audiences’ willingness to support rebels.39
In sum, Twitter serves as an important tool of image projection as it is able to reach both
foreign publics and leaders publicly. Specifically, it allows rebels to penetrate foreign discourses
about the conflict (via disintermediation and scale shifting) and strengthen support for
intervention at both the public and elite levels (via framing, reduction of information
asymmetries and talking points).
Hypotheses: Linking Rebel Diplomacy to Potential Intervener Behavior
Potential interveners contemplate whether to support rebels using a strategic approach. States
typically prefer to intervene when a successful intervention requires a modest amount of
resources, and when the regime that the rebels propose to create after the war is likely to align
more closely with its preferences than the existing regime. To evaluate these factors, potential
interveners seek to gather information through traditional intelligence methods in the warring
state. In this context, rebels’ public pronouncements can provide a missing piece of the puzzle:
their own account of the conflict. This is particularly important because potential interveners
perceive the costs and benefits differently, and as Western finds, factions often form within
decision makers with different perceptions of those trade-offs. Rebels can frame the narrative
of the conflict in a way that gives supporters of intervention more evidence to build on as they
advocate supporting the rebels, and this can prove crucial.40 As strategic actors, we expect
rebels to tailor their message to appeal to the decision calculus of foreign publics and elites,
which center on the expected costs and benefits of co-operation with the insurgents.
First, third parties measure the cost of military aid to rebels in terms of how long the outside
party must remain involved in the conflict, and how many resources it must devote to the rebels
in order to help them achieve victory.41 Rebels can influence international beliefs about the
costs of intervention by demonstrating that they are succeeding on the battlefield, in order to
counteract government propaganda. They can use Twitter to bypass the government’s
monopoly of information about the conflict and to communicate their strength on the battlefield
to external audiences.
HYPOTHESIS 1: Rebel pronouncements regarding their success and determination in the conflict
will increase future co-operation from external actors.
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Rebels can also influence international beliefs about the costs of intervention by
demonstrating that they have the support of the international community, which will reduce
the costs of providing aid in two ways: by legitimating aid to the rebels and by distributing the
burden of supporting the rebels to multiple actors. Indeed, Coggins finds that great powers tend
to coordinate their recognition of secessionist movements, leading to a cascade of recognition
from additional great powers.42 Similarly, Aydin and Regan demonstrate that when multiple
external actors with similar preferences bandwagon in a civil war on behalf of one side, they are
significantly more likely to reduce the duration of the conflict.43 Rebel diplomacy via social
media allows rebels to publicize support from third parties, thus bypassing the government’s
media control and emphasizing to foreign audiences that international support for the rebels is
widespread and growing.
HYPOTHESIS 2: Rebel pronouncements regarding international support will increase future
co-operation from external actors.
Secondly, foreign publics and elites are also concerned with the potential benefits of
supporting the rebels. Public diplomacy allows rebels to shape foreign perceptions of the
potential benefits of intervention by framing their own beliefs and preferences as commensurate
with those of foreign audiences. This representation of the conflict increases the perceived
benefits of co-operating with the rebels, because a rebel victory will be portrayed as producing a
regime that is more closely aligned with outside actors’ preferences. It is critical for rebels to
project interest similarity, because the extent to which a potential intervener’s preferences
overlap with those of an insurgent group has been found to be a strong predictor of support to
that group in both interstate and intrastate conflicts.44
HYPOTHESIS 3: Rebel pronouncements regarding their aims and beliefs will increase future
co-operation from external actors with similar beliefs as the rebels.
Rebels can also persuade international audiences that their support will yield benefits by
claiming that the government’s actions run counter to the prevailing international normative
framework, and therefore merit international rebuke. Thus rebels will attempt to use social
media to draw attention to government violations of international norms or the rule of law, or
atrocities committed during the course of the conflict. Such a strategy is very important, as US
public support for human rights is sensitive to sudden human rights violations and other major
events.45 Therefore, by providing vivid depictions of government human rights violations,
rebels can mobilize foreign public support for intervention.
HYPOTHESIS 4: Rebel pronouncements regarding government atrocities will increase future
co-operation from international actors.
RESEARCH DESIGN
To test our theoretical insights, we adopt a within-subject design, tracing variation in the
independent and dependent variables over time, rather than across cases. This method has three
main advantages. First, it avoids making assumptions with respect to similarities across cases, as
large-N studies often do.46 Secondly, it provides a richer understanding of how the dependent
42 Coggins 2011.
43 Aydin and Regan 2011.
44 Corbetta 2010; Fazal 2013.
45 McFarland and Mathews 2005.
46 Xiang 2010.
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and independent variables interact. Specifically, we compare days in which rebels use Twitter to
convey messages with days they do not in order to evaluate how support for the rebels changes
when rebels use public diplomacy via Twitter and when they do not. Thirdly, with respect to the
dependent variable, we are able to measure US co-operation with the rebels at a more granular
level by analyzing not simply whether the United States intervenes or not, but by tracing its
specific behaviors (co-operative or conflictual) throughout the civil war.
While a within-case design affords several strengths, it nevertheless has potential drawbacks.
Unlike in the case of experiments, the independent variable of interest (here, whether the rebels
use Twitter or not) is not randomly assigned. If we could randomize the assignment of the
independent variable, we could better isolate its effect, because the only systematic difference
across observations would be whether they experience rebel diplomacy or not. Given the nature
of this study, a randomized experiment is not feasible. As a result, there are two primary
limitations associated with this research design.
First, although the within-case design eliminates some potential confounding factors that
might arise across cases, it cannot remove all of them. Confounding factors are those that might
correlate with both the dependent and independent variable and that, if not accounted for, might
lead to a biased assessment of the magnitude of the relationship between the two. We
meticulously control for the most plausible potential confounders to isolate the effect of social
media on third-party behavior. Specifically, we include measures designed to account for the
nature of the fighting on the ground and negotiations between the government and rebels (the
reciprocal interactions of the Libyan Government and rebels), as well as the role of the US
bureaucracy in determining US behavior.47 Similarly, the robustness checks also account for
traditional forms of diplomacy on the part of the rebels – such as press releases, meetings with
foreign officials and public statements – to distinguish between the effect of the rebel messages
disseminated via social media and the effect of the same messages disseminated via
regular media.
Secondly, while our case represents a typical civil war (see the online appendix), the use of
social media in the Libyan civil war might differ from other cases. These differences raise issues
of external validity: can the results presented below be generalized to other cases? We address
this and related questions in the last section of the article.
The Libyan Case
We investigate the impact of social media on the interaction between the Libyan Government,
rebels and the United States during the Libyan civil war, which took place from February to
October 2011. Peaceful demonstrations in mid-February quickly spiraled into violent clashes
between the government and rebels. By the end of the month, the rebels created the National
Transitional Council (NTC).
We focus on the international actor with the most prominent role in the crisis: the United
States. Libyan rebels were particularly interested in securing US support for at least two
reasons. First, the United States bore the brunt of the costs of the Libyan operation, even though
it involved greater participation of non-US NATO members than previous NATO missions. Not
only did the United States provide ‘70% of the coalition’s intelligence capabilities and a
majority of its refueling assets’,48 it also contributed 66 per cent of the total personnel involved,
47 For a similar operationalization of bureaucratic effects, see Goldstein and Freeman (1991).
48
‘United States in Libya’, Report to Congress by the Defense and State Department officials, 5 June
2011, p. 9.
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52 per cent of the aircraft, 93 per cent of the cruise missiles fired and 34 per cent of sorties
flown.49 Despite providing vocal support for intervention, France and other NATO members
lacked sufficient military capabilities to sustain the intervention without US support; for
instance, non-US members ran low on precision-guided munitions less than one month into the
conflict.50 Secondly, the US has historically been the most frequent third-party intervener,
accounting for roughly 24 per cent of all third-party military interventions in civil wars.51
Thus securing US support was crucial for the rebels, but – importantly for our purposes – US
support was by no means guaranteed. The United States was initially reluctant to be drawn into
the conflict, so much so that the phrase ‘leading from behind’ was coined to define President
Obama’s approach to Libya. There were sharp divisions on the feasibility of US involvement
within the administration. The opposition was particularly powerful and vociferous, including
Vice President Biden, National Security Adviser Thomas E. Donilon, Chief of Staff William M.
Daley, Joint Chiefs Chairman Michael Mullen, Deputy National Security Adviser Denis
McDonough, homeland security adviser John Brennan, and even Secretary of Defense Robert
Gates. The latter was so adamant about this issue that he contemplated resigning in
opposition.52 There were few early supporters of a US intervention, among them UN
Ambassador Susan Rice and White House adviser Samantha Power. President Obama and
Secretary Clinton were undecided, wondering, in the words of Secretary Clinton, ‘who were
these rebels we would be aiding, and were they prepared to lead Libya […]?’53 Similar
divisions were also echoed in Congress, where Senators Kerry, McCain, McConnell and
Lieberman supported aiding the rebels and Democratic Representatives Lee, Woolsey, Honda,
Grijalva and Waters loudly questioned the true motives of US involvement in Libya.54
In this sense, the Libyan civil war presented the US leadership with a conundrum on how to
respond.55 This reluctance created a situation in which rebel diplomacy was pivotal in
persuading the United States to take a more active role.
Twitter as a Tool of Rebel Diplomacy in Libya
Libya represents a useful case with which to examine the use of Twitter as a tool of rebel
diplomacy. First, Libya in the year prior to the onset of conflict, in many respects, looks like a
typical state that is at risk of experiencing civil conflict given its dependence on natural resource
exports, a relatively high number of excluded ethnic groups, multiple neighbors experiencing
civil conflict and a predominantly autocratic neighborhood.56 Secondly, each of the actors in
the conflict – the NTC, the Libyan Government and the United States – considered Twitter a
key method of information dissemination about the conflict and, consequently, the NTC’s use of
Twitter became a core component of a purposeful diplomatic strategy. This section proceeds by
detailing why the Libyan civil war is a useful case for testing our hypotheses, and then offers
some preliminary qualitative evidence to support our theoretical mechanisms before we turn to a
more systematic evaluation of the rebel public diplomacy in the Libyan civil war.
49
‘NATO Operations in Libya’, The Guardian, 31 October 2011.
50 DeYoung and Jaffe 2011.
51 Regan 2000.
52 Gates 2014, 522.
53 Clinton 2014, 364. See also ‘A Tough Call on Libya that Still Haunts’, The Washington Post, 3
February 2016.
54
‘Top US Senators Mull Vote on Libya’, AFP, 31 March 2011.
55 For analogous situations, see Western (2002) on Somalia and Bosnia.
56 For more on the correlates of civil war onset, see, for instance, Hegre and Sambanis (2006). Also, see the
online appendix for a more detailed discussion of Libya.
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Gaining Access to Foreign Audiences
From the initial days of the war, the NTC placed a great deal of importance on public diplomacy
in order to win the support of international actors. In particular, the NTC focused on social
media in order to weaken the traditional role of the media as an ‘information selector’.57 This
phenomenon of disintermediation was all the more important in Libya given the Gaddafi
regime’s massive effort to maintain its privileged access to the media. As a CNN reporter
remarked, Gaddafi actively sought to frame journalists’ perception of the war ‘through the
windows of government buses driving along routes selected by government minders that
show[ed] a pro-government landscape’.58
To foster its public diplomacy effort, the NTC quickly established a Media and
Communication Committee, which contained a dedicated Social Media Unit with the largest
personnel allocation within that committee.59 The official NTC Twitter account went live on
6 March 2011. To reach foreign audiences, the rebels tweeted almost exclusively in English and
kept their Twitter account open. These choices expanded the reach of their message
tremendously, as anyone, regardless of whether they were among the 18,000 official followers,
or even possessed a Twitter account, could easily view all of their tweets.60
Thus the NTC used Twitter as a diplomatic tool to build a large coalition by elevating a local
crisis to the international level – an activity known as scale shifting.61 The unique, many-to-
many communication that social media offers is invaluable for social groups trying to build a
large coalition.62 Twitter was already a widely recognized means of disseminating information
on dissident movements for international audiences by the start of the uprisings in Libya, at the
tail end of the so-called Twitter revolution. By contrast, only 0.9 per cent of the Libyan
population had access to Twitter in 2011, and barely 12 per cent of the population had internet
access.63 Despite this limited domestic access, the Libyan Government attempted to cut internet
access in the country following the initial demonstrations, likely because they were wary of the
opposition’s ability to use it to disseminate a compelling narrative abroad. To circumvent this
action, the rebels devised a complex satellite system to maintain internet access.64
Tailoring a Narrative of the Conflict
US elites were divided as to the merits of intervention. The type of information communicated
by the NTC on Twitter was becoming increasingly important to ‘open source intelligence’ –
public information that is readily available on the internet and that increasingly contributes to
intelligence agencies’ assessment of developments on the ground. The CIA Open Source Center
relies on such information to complement traditional intelligence sources because, in the words
of its director, foreign actors sharing their perspective on social media helps them ‘by-pass
foreign governments’ usual monopoly on the “official version” of the events’.65 Moreover,
57 Della Porta and Mosca 2005, 167.
58 David McKenzie, CNN, 7 June 2011.
59 Foss 2012, 58.
60 For an explanation of the difference between public and protected tweets, see https://support. twitter.com/
articles/14016.
61 Livingston and Asmolov 2010, 751; Tarrow 2010, 219.
62 Fung, Russon, and Shkabatur 2013.
63 Arab Social Media Report, Vol. 1, No.2, p. 17; Internet World Stats, ‘Internet Cut Off in Libya’, AFP,
18 February 2011.
64 CIWAG report 2011, 31.
65 https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2010-featured-story-archive/open-source-
intelligence.html.
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important members of the Obama administration who had doubts about the intervention
expressed the centrality of social media as a tool for gathering information on ongoing conflicts
abroad. Secretary of State Clinton, for example, argued that ‘online organizing has been a
critical tool for advancing democracy’, thus affirming the view of the Administration that ‘[…]
the internet is a network that magnifies the power and potential of all others. […] Blogs, emails,
social networks, and text messages have opened up new forums for exchanging ideas, and
created new targets for censorship’.66
Thus, once the NTC gained access to social media, it used public diplomacy to frame the
conflict in order to garner foreign support. The leader of the NTC Social Media Unit understood
that ‘leaders in the West were afraid of doing what they have done wrong before: arming and
supporting groups that would go against them later on’.67 In response to this perceived Western
concern regarding the benefits of supporting the rebels, the NTC Media Unit employed Twitter
to project an image that could resonate with the American public and leaders. For example, the
rebels exploited US public opposition to civilian targeting by tweeting copiously about
Gaddafi’s attacks on civilians, because they knew that, in the words of the head of the Social
Media Unit, ‘[Gaddafi’s] atrocities gave [them] a better cause’.68 Indeed, when asked whether
the United States should intervene to prevent a massacre in Libya, 56 per cent of the
respondents gave a positive answer, and 83 per cent of the population declared the protection of
civilians in Libya against Gaddafi’s attacks a very important or somewhat important US foreign
policy goal. Support was less widespread when Americans were simply asked if the United
States should intervene to suppress Gaddafi.69
For supporters of US assistance to the rebels, the public nature of the NTC’s statements on
Twitter also played an important role, because it partially reduced the typical information
asymmetry between the public and the administration on matters of national security. As part of
their strategy, rebels kept their account open to spread their message more broadly. The press
also used the Twitter feed as a source of information on the conflict; the NTC counted among its
official followers many media outlets such as the magazine Foreign Policy, RT and the BBC.
Rebel pronouncements via Twitter created an environment in which supporters of intervention
could credibly signal that intervention is in the broader national interest. In fact, supporters of
intervention emphasized the publicity of the rebels’ statements. In Senate hearings, the deputy
secretary of state affirmed that the secretary of state had agreed to meet the NTC because the
group had ‘publicly stated its commitment to democratic ideals and its rejection of terrorism and
extremist organizations, including Al-Qaeda’.70 For him, the rebels’ public statements were
crucial in determining their aims, arguing that ‘though it will be important to ensure that words
are matched by actions, [the Administration has] been encouraged by the NTC’s public
statements on democracy, treatment of prisoners, human rights and terrorism’.71 Moreover,
Twitter allowed rebels to offer a detailed, informed and readily available framing for US
66 Remarks on Internet Freedom, Secretary Clinton, January 2011.
67 Foss 2012, 62–4.
68 Foss 2012, 61–2.
69 Polls were taken in March 2011 by, respectively, the Pew Research Center, the ABC News/Washington
Post, and CNN/Opinion Research Corporation Poll, on a sample of 1,000 adults nationwide and with a margin of
error of 3.5 or smaller.
70 James B. Steinberg, Deputy Secretary of State Statement before the House Foreign Affairs Committee,
31 March 2011. Emphasis added.
71 http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Steinberg%205-12-11%20Libya%20testimony.pdf. Empha-
sis added, p. 2. See also Report to Congress by the Defense and State Department Officials (15 June 2011),
http://www.fas.org/man/eprint/wh-libya.pdf, pp. 22–4. Emphasis added.
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advocates of intervention – that is, talking points,72 which were important for rallying US
support. Civil wars are often characterized by scarce information, and therefore may become a
breeding ground for conflict within elite circles.73 For example, the rebels’ conscious rejection
of terrorism and description of themselves as ‘freedom fighters’ successfully reverberated in
American presentations of who the rebels were. Under Secretary for Political Affairs Burns
claimed that America had ‘to support the courageous Libyans who have risen up to regain their
rights’.74
Data
To measure the conflict dynamics on the ground between the Gaddafi regime, the NTC and the
United States, we collected original event data from LexisNexis newswire reports, which we
processed using the software TABARI. Using newswires allows us to paint a fine-grained
picture of dynamics within the conflict while reducing the reporting bias introduced by media
fatigue and other forms of incentive-based media distortions that are more likely to affect
articles from news outlets such as the New York Times.75 Moreover, this allows us to capture the
conflict dynamics between the government, the NTC and the United States independent of the
rebels’ use of Twitter.
To ensure the integrity of the data, we omit any newswire report that relies exclusively or
primarily on Twitter as a source of information. We also eliminate duplicate reports, to avoid
having multiple records of the same event. Events in newswires are coded using the CAMEO
event ontology, which includes twenty categories of events ranging from severe conflict to
intense co-operation in all realms of foreign and domestic policy – diplomatic, military and
economic (see the online appendix). With these event data, we build time series that describe
the daily actions of: the government toward the rebels; the rebels toward the government; the
United States toward the rebels; and the United States toward the government. For example, the
time series capturing US behavior toward the rebels measures the US foreign policy actions that
emerge from both the domestic decision-making process – including secret intelligence, public
opinion polls, congressional hearings, executive orders and the like – and responses to events on
the ground in the civil war. These series allow us to reconstruct and understand the interactions
between the three actors as interconnected sequences of actions and reactions, rather than as
isolated episodes of conflict. With these series, we are able to measure and control for the effect
of developments on the ground when evaluating the independent effect of the rebels’ use of
social media.
Event data are quite comprehensive: they record information on material and verbal conflict,
as well as material and verbal co-operation. As a result, when recording Gaddafi’s behavior
toward the rebels, for example, event data capture events as diverse as Gaddafi’s brutal
suppression of rebel forces (25 February) and his offers of a ceasefire agreement (26 July). In
order to categorize the different intensities of conflict or co-operation that material and verbal
acts entail, we use the Goldstein scale, which is broadly employed in the literature (examples
and descriptive statistics in the online appendix). The scale allows us to use these
comprehensive data without sacrificing precision by parsing out pairs of events that are, for
instance, both conflictual, but that entail different intensities of violence. For example, the US
72 Drezner and Farrell 2008, 4.
73 Western 2002.
74 William J. Burns, Under Secretary for Political Affairs Statement before the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, Washington, DC.
75 Schrodt, Gerner, and Yilmaz 2004, 5–10.
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condemnation of Gaddafi’s protest repression on 26 February, and the US decision to use drone
strikes against Gaddafi’s forces on 23 April both represent hostile behavior on the part of the
United States toward Gaddafi, but the drone strikes involve a greater intensity of conflict than
the verbal condemnation.
Given their comprehensiveness and precision, event data offer a measure of third-party
involvement that is much more granular than the dichotomous measure used in many studies
of intervention in civil war.76 In other words, rather than measuring foreign intervention as a
dichotomous event – did the United States intervene or not – based on an arbitrary threshold,
we are able to track the full spectrum of US behavior in the conflict, including acts of
co-operation and conflict (both verbal and material) throughout the civil war.
Twitter Data
To measure the impact of rebel diplomacy through Twitter, we collect original data on the
Twitter activities of the primary rebel organization in the Libyan civil war, the NTC, which was
active on Twitter from 6 March 2011 (we provide examples and discussion in the online
appendix). Our focus is limited to examining the effect of social media as a tool of rebel
diplomacy rather than studying the effect of the whole social media sphere. Therefore we
restrict our measurement to the NTC Twitter account to avoid measurement error. The
provenance and objectives of other non-governmental Twitter accounts, as well as YouTube
channels, that provided information on Libya during the conflict are very heterogeneous. Some
of them were the brainchild of second-generation Libyan emigrants to Europe. Since no direct,
official link between these accounts and the NTC has been established, we cannot use them to
measure the impact of the rebel organization’s use of Twitter as a tool of diplomacy without
introducing inaccuracies and noise in the data.
We code all of the messages that were tweeted by the NTC official account during that period
into four categories, based on their content (publicizing international support, remarking battlefield
success, denouncing government atrocities and clarifying the rebels’ aims).77 Appendix Table 1
provides examples of the tweets we code. Next, we generate a daily count of each category of
tweets reflecting the number of tweets of each type the NTC transmitted on a given day. This
procedure results in five total Twitter series: one for each of the four categories of tweets, and a fifth
that is a count of the total number of tweets sent by the NTC each day, irrespective of their type.
Because these Twitter variables are daily counts, we standardize each of the series when including
them in the vector autoregressive (VAR) models. In the models, we do not impose any assumptions
regarding when these tweets should impact US behavior – that is, should their impact be
immediate, or lagged? Instead, we test different model specifications and triangulate using different
tests to determine which one best represents the dynamics in the data (see discussion below).
The Model
To model the effect of Twitter on the dynamic interactions between the Libyan Government,
the rebels and the United States, we build on a large tradition of studies of conflict interactions
by estimating a VAR.78 Formally, the VAR builds on structural equation models, and considers
76 See, for example, Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, and Joyce 2008; Gent 2008; Jones Forthcoming; Regan 1996.
77 Note that there is also a fifth, residual category consisting of responses to individual messages sent to the
NTC, updates about the status of the NTC website and messages indicating that a statement spanning multiple
tweets is complete, among other topics.
78 For recent examples, see Brandt, Colaresi, and Freeman 2008; Zeitzoff 2011.
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interactions between a set of actors K as dependent on the present and past values of each of the
actors and their counterpart, for a p number of lags. For example, in a system with two actors
(K = 2), the standard-form VAR is:79
y1ðtÞ = b10 + γ11Y1ðt1Þ + γ12Y2ðt1Þ + ϵ1ðtÞ
y2ðtÞ = b20 + γ21Y1ðt1Þ + γ22Y2ðt1Þ + ϵ2ðtÞ ð1Þ
In both equations, y1(t) and y2(t) are stationary, while ϵ1(t) and ϵ2(t) are white noise residuals.
Generalizing to multiple equations, and multiple lags, the VAR is estimated as:
Yt =A0 +A1Yt1 +A2Yt2 + ¼ +ApYtp +Et (2)
Yt is a kX1 vector of endogenous variables, A0 is a kX1 vector of intercepts, Ai is a kXk vector of
coefficients and Et is a kX1 vector of error terms, while p is the number of lags. Here, each of the
K endogenous time series represents one of the following: the rebels’ actions toward the Libyan
Government, the Libyan Government’s actions toward the rebels, the US Government’s actions
toward the rebels, the US Government’s actions toward the Libyan Government and each of the
five types of tweets identified in the previous section.
This modeling technique presents at least four advantages for the study of the Libyan civil
war, and of conflict dynamics more broadly. First, since each time series in vector Yt impacts the
others in vector Yt, the model makes it possible to model conflict events as the outcome of the
action and reaction dynamics between multiple actors. For example, the VAR captures the fact
that the US decision to use drone strikes on Gaddafi’s forces on 23 April was the product of
not only US intelligence and domestic decision-making processes, but also the Libyan
Government’s behavior toward the rebels, and the rebels’ behavior toward the Libyan
Government, on 23 April and during their past interactions.
Secondly, since Yt in Equation 2 is specified as a vector of endogenous variables, the VAR
explicitly incorporates and models the endogenous relationship between these interactions, as
we elaborate below. For example, the United States might express doubts about intervention,
emphasizing how little is known about the rebels. To address this concern, the rebels may use
Twitter to publicize their rejection of terrorism and support for democracy. In order for us to
correctly assess the impact of such tweets on subsequent US behavior, it is necessary to
explicitly incorporate the fact that the rebels’ tweet originated, in part, in response to previous
US behavior toward the rebels. The VAR model addresses precisely this type of endogenous
relationship between all these series, which allows us to model the conflict process as a whole,
and to test whether rebel Twitter usage has an independent effect on any of the other series in
the model.
Thirdly, since the number of relevant lags, p, is derived from the data, the degree to which
decisions such as the one in our example depend on past interactions between the rebels, the
government and the United State is endogenously determined from the data, rather than
arbitrarily assumed (see the online appendix).
Finally, the VAR model makes it possible to compare US behavior toward the rebels under
two conditions: when rebels use Twitter as a tool of diplomacy and when they do not, thus
providing a counterfactual condition to analyze how US behavior varies in the presence and
absence of rebel diplomacy through Twitter. This is the case because each of the endogenous
variables in vector Yt is a time series that tracks the behavior of the actors of interest over time,
rather than just recording the moments when they engage in a specified action.
79 Enders 2008, 265.
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In sum, the use of a within-case research design in conjunction with the VAR model allows
us to ask: given the complex interactions between the United States, the rebels and the Libyan
Government that characterized the Libyan civil conflict, and the endogeneity between them,
did NTC diplomacy via Twitter significantly change US behavior in the civil war? That is,
following days in which the rebels use social media, does US behavior become more
co-operative than it does following days in which the rebels do not use social media?
RESULTS
A VAR with k equations and p lags contains k × ((k × p) + 1) coefficients, which means that no
single coefficient or subgroup of coefficients can represent the substantive and statistical
significance of the impact of changes in one variable.80 Instead, the outcomes of the model have
to be illustrated via graphs that track changes in the whole system of equations by taking into
account how changes in one variable ripple through the whole system.81
The Impact of Twitter on US Behavior
To assess whether Twitter represented an effective tool of rebel diplomacy, we investigate its
impact on US actions toward the Libyan rebels via item response function graphs (IRFs) in
Figure 1. The black dots within each plot answer the question: if the rebels tweet a specific
message, does US behavior toward the rebels become more co-operative (positive values), more
conflictual (negative values) or remain unchanged over time? In Figure 1, the x-axis represents
each of the five types of Twitter series: one series that conflates all the tweets together,
irrespective of the message; one that only codes tweets on international support; one that only
codes tweets on battlefield success; one that only codes tweets that clarify aims; and one that
only codes tweets that publicize atrocities. The y-axis represents the degree to which the United
States becomes co-operative (for values above 0) or conflictual (for values below 0) toward
the rebels in response to that tweet, while controlling for the interactions between the
United States and the government, and between the government and the rebels. In technical
terms, the black dots trace how a one-standard-deviation positive shock in a specific variable
(Twitter, the impulse function) affects another variable (US behavior toward the rebels,
the response function), accounting for dependencies across the whole system of equations
over time.
Starting from the left-hand side of Figure 1, we find that tweets have a positive, significant
effect on US behavior toward the rebels, controlling for the activities on the ground between
rebels and the government, for US actions toward both the government and the rebels, and for
the endogeneity that characterizes activities between these actors and Twitter. Disaggregating
these tweets to examine which messages impact US behavior, we find that messages that speak
to the benefits of intervening on the side of the rebels increase US co-operation toward the
rebels, thus making Twitter an effective tool of rebel diplomacy. Specifically, compared to days
in which Libyan rebels do not use Twitter as a tool of diplomacy, US behavior toward the rebels
80 Brandt and Williams 2007, 37. The online appendix contains details on the model specification procedure.
To present the hardest test for the statistical significance of rebel diplomacy via Twitter, we include the Twitter
series last in the specification of the VAR model. This amounts to asking: does diplomacy via Twitter alter
patterns of US co-operation toward the rebels after accounting for all of the other interactions that take place on
the ground (Brandt and Williams 2007, 40–2)?
81 For these reasons, IRF and FEVD also represent the most common form of results presentation. See, for
example, Brandt, Colaresi, and Freeman (2008).
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becomes significantly more co-operative when the rebels use Twitter to express preferences
similar to those of the United States on respect for human rights, democracy and opposing
terrorism, and to convey information regarding human rights abuses and the illegitimacy of the
Libyan Government. This finding supports Hypotheses 3 and 4.
Rebel attempts to persuade foreign audiences of their shared beliefs and values, for example
by repudiating terrorism, correspond to a 2.5 per cent increase in the level of US co-operation
with the rebels.82 By comparison, a co-operative gesture toward the government on the part of
the rebels outside of social media, for example expressing support for a ceasefire through
traditional media, only increases US co-operation with them by 0.9 per cent, which is
indistinguishable from zero at the 90 per cent confidence level, indicating that diplomacy via
Twitter can produce a larger shift in US co-operation than does rebel behavior toward the
government.
On average, the effect of Twitter as a tool of rebel diplomacy is not immediate; the impact is
evident after four or five days. Moreover, as Figure 2 shows (see discussion below), the
substantive impact of Twitter grows over time. Taken together, these two findings – that it takes
tweets a few days to start affecting US behavior toward the rebels, and that their effect grows
over time – provide further evidence that diplomacy via Twitter impacts US behavior toward the
rebels by shaping the perception of the conflict in the United States, rather than a more
immediate mechanism, such as the provision of battlefield information. At the same time, the
relatively prompt time frame within which Twitter affected US behavior reflects the famously
accelerated time frame that characterized the decision making regarding the Libyan civil
war in the United States – the speed spurred a momentous debate on the proper timing of force




Total International support Battlefield success Denounce government
IRF 95% C.I. 90% C.I.
Clarify aims
Fig. 1. Twitter effect on US behavior toward the rebels
Note: IRF graphs for VAR models show the impact of a one-standard-deviation increase in the number of
each type of tweet on the US behavior toward the rebels four days after the increase in Twitter usage occurs.
For more IRF results, see the online appendix.
82 We logged the data, see Brandt and Williams (2007, 50).
83
‘Speaker Boehner Letter to President Obama on Military Action in Libya’, Speaker Press Release,
22 March 2011.
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Taken together, these results confirm the importance of rebel diplomacy in understanding
developments within civil wars, while suggesting a nuanced understanding of its effectiveness.
Specifically, rebel diplomacy is less effective when it conveys information that is readily
accessible through other channels, such as information about international support or battlefield
outcomes. It is more effective when it allows actors who are relatively unknown in the
international arena to project a positive image to international audiences as a credible and
preferable alternative to the local government, while overcoming that government’s privileged
access to international media.
Substantive Significance
The Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (FEVD) graphs presented in Figure 2 examine
the substantive significance of the results by gauging the relative importance of rebel diplomacy
via Twitter compared to other determinants of US behavior toward the rebels. It displays what
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Fig. 2. Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (FEVD) graphs, VAR(4) model. (a) Clarify aims and beliefs;
(b) Publicize government atrocities
Note: the plot presents the percentage of US behavior toward the rebels (response function) that is explained
by other series in the model, over seven days.
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percentage of US behavior toward the rebels is explained by the behavior of other actors, rather
than by US intelligence and decision-making processes.84 For example, when the United States
used drone strikes against the Libyan Government on 23 April, the FEVD plots determine what
percentage of that action was explained by the actions of the government toward the rebels (light
gray areas), of the rebels toward the government (dark gray areas), of the United States toward
the Libyan Government (medium gray areas) and rebel diplomacy via Twitter (black areas).
We find that bureaucratic politics within the United States has a large substantive effect on
determining US behavior in the conflict. This suggests that, intuitively, US policy toward the
rebels is influenced by past US policy toward the rebels, as these past policy actions reflect the
culmination of US intelligence, military and political decision-making processes, which in turn
continue to shape US policy moving forward. However, as Figure 2 indicates, US domestic
politics is not the sole determinant of US behavior toward the rebels, and as time passes, the
behavior of other actors in the conflict plays a growing role in shaping future US behavior.
Most notably for our purposes, the rebel use of social media displays a moderate, but clear,
substantive impact on US behavior toward the rebels. With a four- or five-day lag, rebel
diplomacy (black area) becomes as important a determinant of US behavior toward the rebels as
the Libyan Government’s actions toward the rebels (light gray area). This suggests that
US behavior toward the rebels is determined in large part by its own domestic decision-making
process, but that outside forces help shape US actions in the conflict, and rebel use of Twitter
plays a meaningful role in that process.
In sum, we find that Twitter was an effective tool of rebel diplomacy: when rebels used it
to emphasize the similarity of their own beliefs and values with those of foreign audiences,
and the divergence of the existing government’s beliefs and behavior from those values,
US co-operation toward the rebels increased over the following week, controlling for the
US intelligence and domestic decision-making processes, as well as the interactions between the
Libyan Government and rebels, and the endogeneity between all these factors. Conversely, in
the counterfactual situation when rebels did not engage in diplomacy via Twitter to spread these
messages, US co-operation with them was lower. These results hold even when controlling for
more traditional forms of rebel diplomacy, as well as for the interaction of the United States
and NATO.
Robustness Checks: Traditional Diplomacy and NATO
We estimate a model in which we control for more traditional forms of diplomacy on the part of
rebels to account for whether the effect of public diplomacy via Twitter on third parties’ policies
toward the rebels is significant, even when controlling for other mediums of rebel diplomacy.
This series includes both material and verbal acts on the part of the rebels toward the United
States. Such acts are often geared toward spreading their narrative of the conflict abroad: for
example, sending delegations abroad, meeting with Secretary of State Clinton or releasing press
statements to traditional media organizations. This series accounts for numerous additional
pathways through which rebels attempt to interact with foreign audiences, both directly and
indirectly, by relaying messages through the media. Our results are robust (see Appendix
Figure 4), which is consistent with our claim that Twitter enables a unique form of diplomacy
that is distinct from more traditional diplomatic acts. We then estimate a model in which we also
control for the interactions between the United States and its NATO allies. Examples of these
interactions are the emergency meeting called by the NATO secretary general to discuss the
84 The bars in the plot do not sum to 1, as we do not depict the effect of past US behavior toward the rebels in
these plots.
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Libyan situation (25 February) and the US appeal to its NATO allies to step up their
contribution to the mission (10 June). Our results on the impact of Twitter are robust (see
Appendix Figure 5), which is consistent with the fact that both the material and strategic impact
of NATO on the Libyan operation was, in the words of Secretary of Defense Gates, ‘dismal’
(see the Appendix for discussion).
TOWARD A RESEARCH AGENDA ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN CIVIL WARS
The Libyan case shares many common characteristics of states that experience civil war (see
Appendix), making it a useful case for evaluating the impact of rebel use of public diplomacy.
However, an in-depth analysis of a single case is insufficient to offer definitive inferences
regarding the generalizability of the findings, due to potentially important differences across
cases regarding the use of public diplomacy. During the Syrian civil war, for instance, multiple
rebel groups have used social media, often to reach foreign audiences.
This variation in the use of social media raises an issue with respect to the generalizability of
our results: to what extent does the evidence we presented for the Libyan civil war apply to
other cases? In this section, we present a research agenda, delineating important questions left to
explore to understand the role of social media in public diplomacy, and clarifying what our
exploratory test (Libya) suggests about them.
The first set of questions concerns the actors that utilize social media. For example, how will
opposing messages from multiple rebel organizations in the same conflict affect the narrative
that foreign audiences observe? In Syria, for instance, multiple rebel actors with divergent
preferences use social media to propagate their narrative of the conflict. Bob suggests that
different rebel groups often compete to gain the support of transnational organizations.85 Our
results suggest that the NTC increased US co-operation by using social media to consistently
frame itself as preferable to the current regime. However, in Libya there was a single rebel
organization. Further research may usefully evaluate whether such a narrative might prove
similarly impactful if it is only one message among many from rebel groups in the conflict.
Situations with multiple competing messages lead to another avenue for research: how can a
third party ascertain the ‘type’ of a particular rebel group (for example, whether their
preferences are consistent)? In the case of Libya, we draw on observational and experimental
studies that demonstrate that cheap talk can shape the beliefs and perceptions of actors86 to
argue that rebel public diplomacy was useful in framing the conflict to mobilize potential
supporters abroad. Further research may extend this analysis by exploring the strategic interplay
between third parties and rebel groups in the context of a signaling game with incomplete
information.
Similarly, it will be fruitful to further investigate the conditions under which the government
will use Twitter. In Libya, we find that rebels used public diplomacy to fight the government’s
privileged access to the media, while the government responded by trying to cut internet access.
By contrast, the Syrian Government has also taken to Twitter extensively in an effort, much like
rebel organizations, to frame the nature of the conflict and portray itself as opposing extremism.
Similarly, the Israeli Defense Forces have been actively engaging Hamas on social media for
years in an effort to condemn Hamas’ behavior, report atrocities carried out by Hamas and
defend their own actions.87 New research on these issues can usefully contribute to the current
85 Bob 2001.
86 Thyne 2006; Tingley and Walter 2011.
87 Zeitzoff 2016.
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debate on whether new communication technologies expand or curtail the state’s repressive
power.88
A second set of research questions deals with the nature of the diplomatic effort itself. For
example, how does rebels’ use of social media correspond to their organizational capacity?
Evidence from the Libyan case suggests that the relationship between the strength of the NTC
organization and the shape of the diplomatic effort is by no means trivially evident. On the one
hand, it is possible to surmise that the more resources the rebels possess, the greater the
opportunity they have to use this tool to convey a consistent image. As the Libyan case
demonstrates, the diplomatic effort requires many and different resources to sustain their image-
framing attempt – from devising a complex satellite system to circumvent the government’s
internet shutdown to allocating a dedicated set of personnel to the Social Media Unit. On the
other hand, the NTC case also suggests that the weaker the rebel group is, the greater its
willingness to use public diplomacy to reach out to potential interveners. The rebels felt an
urgent need to attract foreign support, especially when they were weak. Further research on the
relationship between rebel capacity and their reliance on social media and diplomacy can
increase our understanding of the role played by rebels in the course of civil wars as strategic
actors, not just in the context of their interactions with the local government, as present studies
investigate,89 but also in the international arena.
A related question is how the use of social media as a tool of rebel diplomacy will
evolve over time. The centrality of Twitter as a tool for scale shifting emerged forcefully after the
so-called Arab Spring, which made it an important ‘focal point’ for public diplomacy. Indeed, the
ability of a particular tool to facilitate access to the target audience is an important permissive
condition of public diplomacy’s effectiveness: using Twitter would be of little or no help to rebels
if it were not used by their audience, just as publishing a pamphlet would have been useless to
Thomas Paine if none of his target audience was literate. However, findings in the Libyan case
suggest that the fact that Twitter usage was widespread was not per se sufficient to guarantee the
success of the diplomatic effort. Our finding that not all types of transmitted messages were
effective suggests that the content of the messages was also key in determining the usefulness of
the tool. Further research on the impact of different tools of public diplomacy can enrich our
understanding of this crucial activity in the international arena.90
CONCLUSIONS
The implications of our results extend to several fields of study, highlighting fruitful
opportunities to connect different areas of research. First, by modeling the relationships between
the government, the rebels and the United States throughout the crisis in a granular fashion,
taking into account individual episodes of co-operation or conflict, this analysis reveals the
active role of rebels as strategic players attempting to win further support from external powers
as the conflict unfolds.91 This insight, in turn, emphasizes the importance of bringing recent
findings on the political effects of social media92 to bear on the investigation of third parties’
decisions about whether to intervene.93 Secondly, these results suggest that rebels often decide
88 See, among others, Rød and Weidmann 2015.
89 See, for example, Kalyvas 2006; Wood 2010.
90 Cull 2013.
91 Schelling 1960.
92 See, for instance, McGarty et al. 2014.
93 For example Aydin and Regan 2011; Gent 2008; Regan 1996.
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to shift resources away from the battlefield and toward diplomacy, which highlights the
importance for the literature on rebel diplomacy of studying how rebels calculate this trade-off
in resource allocation.94 Finally, by showing that Twitter is an effective vehicle of public
diplomacy, these results underscore the importance of extending the research on the
effectiveness of diplomacy95 to interactions within the civil war context.
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